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THE LONG, NOT-SO PACIFIC STRUGGLE
FOR THE COAST: A BORDER DISPUTE
BETWEEN CHILE AND BOLIVIA
Zach J. Kleiman
IN the midst of contentious litigation before the International Court
of Justice (ICJ), tensions between the countries of Bolivia and Chile
are at an all-time high.' The dispute is a culmination of over a cen-
tury of affairs between the countries: one war,2 multiple delineations,3
several treaties,4 and countless fights over valuable, natural resources.5
But ultimately, this case is a fight about the invaluable sovereign access to
the Pacific Ocean, which Bolivia has lost over the years. 6 In short, Bo-
livia contends that the actions of various Chilean authorities created an
obligation for Chile to negotiate a sovereign access to the Pacific for Bo-
livia.7 Chile, on the other hand, claims that the ICJ does not have juris-
diction over this case because the subject of the dispute is settled and
governed by a prior treaty.8 On September 24, 2015, the Court denied
Chile's contention that the ICJ lacked jurisdiction, and thus, the case will
be heard.on the merits.9 This case has tremendous implications on inter-
national law as a whole, but the consequences for the respective countries
are immeasurable.10
1. Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bol. v. Chile), Application, 1
(April 24, 2013), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/153/17338.pdf.
2. Bolivia/Chile Pacific Access, COUNCIL ON HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS, 14-17 (June 24,
2011), http://www.coha.org/boliviachile-pacific-access/#_ftnl.
3. Id. at 6, 16.
4. Id. at 5, 7, 15.
5. Id. at 4.
6. Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean, Application at $ 1.
7. Id. at 1 31.
8. Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bol. v. Chile), Preliminary
Objection, ¶1.1 (July 15, 2014), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/1.53/
18616.pdf.
9. Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bol. v. Chile), Judgment, ¶54
(September 24, 2015), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/153/18746.pdf.
10. Bolivia's Claim to the Sea: What's at Stake and Why it Matters, TELESURENGLISH,
(May 5, 2015), http://www.telesurtv.net/english/analysis/Bolivias-Claim-to-the-Sea-
Whats-at-Stake-and-Why-it-Matters-20150505-0010.html.
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I. UNDERSTANDING HOW THE DISPUTE CAME TO BE
A. HISTORY OF CHILEAN-BOLIVIAN RELATIONS
In order to appreciate the significance of this case, one must first un-
derstand the history of the region, as well as the enduring, salty relation-
ship between Bolivia and Chile. It is a long and convoluted history, so
this note will only focus on the key events."
When Bolivia first gained its independence in 1825, it had direct access
to the Pacific Ocean, with a coastline stretching more than 400 kilometers
long1.2 by means of what is now known as the Atacama Desert. 3 But,
because of vast natural resources located in this coastal region, especially
guano, which was used for fertilizer and gunpowder, the region was
highly sought after by the surrounding countries. 14 Eventually, despite
efforts between Chile and Bolivia to agree upon how the land should be
treated, the Bolivian Congress increased taxes on all nitrate miners,1 5 and
threatened to seize and auction Chilean assets if the tax was not paid. 16
When the tax was not paid, the Bolivian government did just that, starting
what is known as the War of the Pacific. 17 This four year war, in which
Chile dominated both Peru and Bolivia, came to a conclusion with the
signing of two treaties: the 1883 Treaty of Anc6n with Peru and the 1884
Truce of Valparaiso with Bolivia, which handed over Bolivia's coastal ter-
ritory to Chile.1 8
More importantly, in 1904, Chile and Bolivia signed the Treaty of
Peace and Amity (1904 Peace Treaty), which re-affirmed and cemented
aspects of the 1884 Treaty, and permanently surrendered all of Bolivia's
coastal territory in exchange for various conditions.1 9 Specifically, Chile
would build a railway from La Paz to the Port of Arica at its own ex-
pense,2 0 incur various financial obligations of Bolivia, 21 pay the Bolivian
government a sum of cash, 22 give Bolivia the right to establish customs
agencies in designated ports,23 and offer in perpetuity "the fullest and
most unrestricted right of commercial transit in its territory and its Pacific
ports." 2 4 Since Bolivia signed this treaty, surrendering the land it had
11. Bolivia/Chile Pacific Access, supra note 2.
12. Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean, Application at ¶ 9.
13. Bolivia/Chile Pacific Access, supra note 2 at 1.




16. Bolivia/Chile Pacific Access, supra note 2 at 14.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 16.
19. Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bol. v. Chile), Preliminary
Objection, 139 (July 15, 2014), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/153/18
616.pdf.




24. Id. at 147.
2016] BORDER DISPUTE BETWEEN CHILE & BOLIVIA
worked so hard to protect, the Bolivian government has tried to convince
Chile to open talks about granting Bolivia sovereign access to the sea. 2 5
These efforts, which resulted in various exchanges and declarations of
Chilean officials, are the basis of Bolivia's claim before the ICJ. Bolivia
contends that these actions created an obligation for Chile to negotiate,
separate and independent from the 1904 Peace Treaty.26
B. ECONOMIC IMPACT OF BEING LANDLOCKED
The crippling effects of being landlocked led Bolivia to adamantly ar-
gue that it has a legal right to part of the coastal region of South
America. 2 7 Most notably is the impact the geographic disposition has on
trade. 2 8 Since Bolivia became landlocked, the country has been forced to
rely on roadway infrastructure rather than more efficient, maritime sys-
tems.2 9 According to the U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America
and the Caribbean, only 7.1 percent of Bolivia's roads are paved, which
illustrates why Bolivia was rated as having the second worst infrastruc-
ture in South America.3 0 According to the 2013 Global Enabling Trade
Report, Bolivia ranked eighty-seven out of one-hundred and thirty-eight
in the Enabling Trade Index, which carefully takes into account market
access, border administration, infrastructure, and operating environ-
ment.3 1 Chile, on the other hand, ranked eighth.32 Imports in Bolivia
take twice as long as those in Chile, and cost over $800 more per
container, while exports take about a week longer in Bolivia, and cost
$510 more per container.33 Chile faces the lowest average tariff in the
world at 3.5 percent, while Bolivia pays an average tariff of 4.9 percent.34
The two most problematic factors Bolivia faces in importing goods are
corruption at the border and high tariffs,35 issues that are almost certainly
impacted by being landlocked. As one might imagine, having direct ac-
cess to a coastline simplifies logistics and. thus, can lower costs. 3 6 Bo-
25. Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bol. v. Chile), Application,
¶17 (April 24, 2013), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/153/17338.pdf.
26. Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bol. v. Chile), Written State-
ment of the Plurinational State of Bolivia on the Preliminary Objection to Jurisdic-
tion Filed by Chile, ¶ 7 (Nov. 7, 2014), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/
files/153/18622.pdf.
27. The World Bank, Landlocked Countries: Higher Transport Costs, Delays, Less
Trade (June 16, 2008), http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2008/06/16/land-
locked-countries-higher-transport-costs-delays-less-trade.
28. Id.
29. Bolivia's Claim to the Sea: What's at Stake and Why it Matters, TEusSURENGLISH,
(May 5, 2015), http://www.telesurtv.net/english/analysis/Bolivias-Claim-to-the-Sea-
Whats-at-Stake-and-Why-it-Matters-20150505-001 0.html.
30. Id.
31. World Economic Forum, Global Enabling Trade Report 2014 76 (Margareta
Drzeniek Hanouz et al. eds., 2014).
32. Id. at 98.
33. Id. at 77, 99.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 76.
36. Id. at 36.
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livia's logistics costs are 31% higher than the regional average.37
Although it may not be the only reason, it is hard to believe that Chile's
vast access to the border is not somewhat responsible for this great dis-
parity in trade between the two countries.
C. ACTIONS AND EVENTS SUPPORTING BOLIVIA'S CLAIM
Bolivia's argument can only be understood by examining the specific
exchanges and actions that Bolivia contends created this obligation to
open negotiations. First, in 1950, replying to a note from the Bolivian
government urging Chile to consider entering negotiations, Chile re-
sponded, "my Government . .. is willing to formally enter into a direct
negotiation aiming at finding the formula which would make it possible to
grant Bolivia an own and sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean. ".38
Furthermore, in 1975, the President of Chile and Bolivia signed the Joint
Declaration of Charafia, which, in part, included an agreement to "con-
tinue with the dialogue on different levels to find formulas for solving
vital issues. . .such as the one relating to the confinement affecting Bo-
livia. . .. " Finally, evidenced by the minutes of various diplomatic
meetings between Chile and Bolivia, the countries confirmed that they
would continue the mutual trust that apparently was achieved in prior
meetings in order to "propose how to reach concrete, feasible, and useful
solutions during the next and successive meetings. ... "40
Despite these events, Chile adamantly denies Bolivia's claim of a right
to sovereign access to the sea and even alleges that there are no pending
issues between Bolivia and Chile. 41 The fundamental disagreement
about whether these events between the two countries created an obliga-
tion for Chile to negotiate sovereign access to the Pacific with Bolivia is
the basis of Bolivia's claim before the ICJ.4 2
II. INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE PROCEEDINGS
A. OVERVIEW
After decades of attempting to persuade Chile to open negotiations,
Bolivia decided to take another route. On April 24, 2013, Bolivia filed an
Application Instituting Proceedings before the International Court of
Justice, contending that (1) Chile has an obligation to negotiate an agree-
ment granting Bolivia sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean; (2) Chile
breached that obligation; and therefore, (3) Chile must perform this obli-
37. Martin De Angelis, Chile-Bolivia Land Dispute has long-term Implications for
Mining and Gas, GLO3AL RISK INSIGHTS (May 22, 2015), http://globalriskinsights
.com/2015/05/chile-bolivia-land-dispute-has-long-term-implications-for-mining-
and-gas.
38. Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bol. v. Chile), Application,
¶18 (April 24, 2013), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/153/17338.pdf.
39. Id. at 39.
40. Id. at 58.
41. Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean, Application at 1 29.
42. Id. at T 1.
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gation promptly, and in good faith.43 In response, Chile claimed that the
ICJ does not have jurisdiction over the case pursuant to Article VI of the
Pact of Bogati. 4 4 In its application, Bolivia points to Article XXXI of the
Pact of BogatA in order to invoke ICJ jurisdiction. 4 5 Article XXXI states
that the ICJ shall have jurisdiction over disputes between participating
parties that arise from: "(a) the interpretation of a treaty; (b) any ques-
tion of international law; (c) the existence of any fact which, if estab-
lished, would constitute the breach of an international obligation; and (d)
the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an
international obligation." 46 Bolivia claimed jurisdiction is proper under
Article XXXI (b)-(d) because the dispute was regarding an obligation
separate from the 1904 Treaty, and was a question of international law
about the existence and consequences of a breach of an international ob-
ligation.4 7 But, Chile focused on Article VI of the Pact of Bogatd, an
exception clause that states:
"The aforesaid procedures, furthermore, may not be applied to mat-
ters already settled by arrangement between the parties, or by arbi-
tral award or by decision of an international court, or which are
governed by agreements or treaties in force on the date of the conclu-
sion of the present Treaty." 4 8
So, Chile argued that the subject matter of the case was territorial sov-
ereignty and the character of Bolivia's access to the Pacific Ocean, and
that these issues were matters governed by the 1904 Peace Treaty, and
therefore, were excluded from the jurisdiction of the ICJ under Article
VI of the Pact of BogatA.4 9 Bolivia responded to the objection, arguing
that Chile mischaracterized the subject matter in Bolivia's application,
and that the dispute was not about revisiting or amending content of the
1904 Peace Treaty, but it was a completely separate and independent is-
sue: whether or not Chile's subsequent actions created an obligation inde-
pendent of any prior treaty.50
Thus, the court's decision on the objection rested on a single issue: the
subject matter of the case.5 1 If, as Chile argued, the subject of the case
43. Id. at 1 32.
44. Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bol. v. Chile), Preliminary
Objection, $1.2 (July 15, 2014), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/153/
18616.pdf.
45. Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean, Application at 1 5.
46. Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean, Preliminary Objection at 237.
47. Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bol. v. Chile), Written State-
ment of the Plurinational State of Bolivia on the Preliminary Objection to Jurisdic-
tion Filed by Chile, ¶ 22 (Nov. 7, 2014), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/
files/153/18622.pdf.
48. Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean, Preliminary Objection at 23
(emphasis added).
49. Id. at 1 1.1.
50. Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean Written Statement of Bolivia
at 1 22.
51. See Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bol. v. Chile), Judgment,
124 (September 24, 2015), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/153/18746
.pdf.
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were territorial sovereignty and the character of Bolivia's access to the
Pacific Ocean, the Court would then determine if those issues were gov-
erned by the Peace Treaty of 1904.52 If the court concluded that they
were, then the Court would not have jurisdiction. But, if the subject mat-
ter was Chile's separate obligation to negotiate Bolivia's sovereign access
to the Pacific in light of past exchanges between Chile and Bolivia, a sub-
ject not mentioned in the Peace Treaty of 1904, then Article VI does not
apply, and jurisdiction would be proper.53
In the judgment issued on September 24, 2015, the ICJ tackled two
issues: (1) the subject matter of the dispute, and (2) whether or not that
matter is precluded by Article VI of the Pact of Bogatd.54 Agreeing with
Bolivia, the Court held that the subject matter of the dispute was whether
Chile is obligated to negotiate Bolivia's access to the Pacific, and in the
case there is an obligation, whether it was breached.5 5 The Court then
went on to explain that the "provisions of the 1904 Peace Treaty.. .do not
expressly or impliedly address the question of Chile's alleged obligation
to negotiate Bolivia's sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean."5 6 Thus,
Chile's objection to jurisdiction was denied and the case will proceed on
the merits.57
It is important to make a distinction between this holding and the hear-
ing of the case on its merits. The procedural proceeding decided whether
the specific issue, not the overall goal of the claim, was governed by a
former treaty, in order to determine whether the ICJ could even hear the
case.5 8 The Court did not address, as it surely will when hearing the case
on its merits, whether or not the outcome of the issue will contradict prin-
ciples already established by the 1904 Peace Treaty.5 9 A holding that the
1904 Peace Treaty does not cover the subject matter of Bolivia's claim
simply prevents dismissal of the case, and is separate from the notion that
the outcome of that claim could contradict express provisions of the
Treaty itself.
B. INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE PRECEDENT AS A PREDICTOR
The International Court of Justice has dealt with issues similar to the
issue at hand, and therefore, it may be telling to examine these prior cases
to trace any tendencies or trends of the ICJ on analogous issues.60 In
1962, the ICJ heard a border dispute between present-day Cambodia and
Thailand where each country claimed that the Temple of Preah Vihear
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1 50.
54. Id.
55. Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean, Judgment at ¶ 34.
56. Id. at ¶ 50.
57. Id. at 54.
58. See Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean, Judgment at ¶ 54.
59. Id. at ¶ 32.
60. Andr6s GuzmAn Escobari, Bolivia's Reasonably Strong ICJ Case Against Chile,
OPINo JURIS (March 21, 2014), http://opiniojuris.org/2014/03/21/bolivias-reasona
bly-strong-icj-case-chile/.
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resided on its territory.6 1 Under a previous treaty, the exact delineation
was to be established by a Franco-Siamese Mixed Commission, but be-
cause this Commission apparently made no record of their findings, Cam-
bodia relied on a map made in the final delimitation stage when various
French officials (some on the Commission) produced maps of the dis-
puted areas. 62 Cambodia relied on this map, which illustrated the temple
as being on the Cambodian side of the border, for its claim of sovereignty
over the coveted sanctuary, while Thailand contended that, because this
map was not the work of the Commission, it had no binding effect under
the treaty. 63
The court held that, even though the map was not binding at its crea-
tion, it became binding due to the subsequent unilateral actions of Thai-
land. 6 4 Because Thai authorities had no adverse reaction for many years,
they seemingly accepted this map as true. 65 The Court also reasoned that
Thailand's continued use and even publishing of maps depicting the tem-
ple on Cambodian territory further supported Cambodia's contention
that a map not created by the Commission nonetheless effectively estab-
lished the border.66 Interestingly, the ICJ does have a history of uphold-
ing obligations created by the conduct of governmental officials.67
In a 1974 case between New Zealand and France, New Zealand argued
that various declarations and letters of French officials created an obliga-
tion to terminate nuclear tests in the South Pacific after the completion of
a series of tests.6 8 The office of the President of France conveyed to New
Zealand that, "in view of the stage reached in carrying out the French
nuclear defence programme France will be in a position to pass on to the
stage of underground explosions as soon as the series of tests planned for
this summer is completed".6 9 France argued that these statements simply
left open the possibility to cease testing, but the Court concluded that it
must "form its own view of the meaning and scope intended to be given
to these unilateral declarations."70 Considering this, the Court deter-
mined that "[i]t is well recognized that declarations made by way of uni-
lateral acts, concerning legal or factual situations, may have the effect of
creating legal obligations," and therefore held that this statement, along
61. Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), Summary of the Summary of the
Judgment, 58 (June 15, 1962), available at http://www.icjcij.org/docket/index.php?
sum=284&pl=3&p2=3&case=45&p3=5.





67. Andr6s Guzmin Escobari, Bolivia's Reasonably Strong ICI Case Against Chile,
OPIN1o JURIS (March 21, 2014), http://opiniojuris.org/2014/03/21/bolivias-reasona-
bly-strong-icj-case-chile/.
68. Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France), Summary of the Summary of the Judg-
ment (December 20, 1974), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/?sum=317&
code=nzf&pl=3&p2=3&case=59&k=6b&p3=5.
69. Id. at 99.
70. Id.
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with the statement of other officials, created a binding obligation to hold
no further tests in the South Pacific.7 1
Previous ICJ cases illustrate the Court's willingness to uphold obliga-
tions created by the unilateral conduct of one nation's officials,72 even if
the outcome contradicts a prior treaty.7 3 This history works in the favor
of Bolivia, but there are distinctions.7 4 Because of the unique set of facts
in the Temple of Preah Vihear case, the proposition that an obligation can
stand even if it contradicts a treaty may not be applicable in this case.7 5
In the Temple of Preah Vihear case, it was nearly impossible to abide by
the treaty's requirement that a joint Commission establish the border be-
cause the Commission failed to document findings, and thus, the court
was left with little choice but to interpret past dealings and conduct of the
two countries in order to establish the proper borders.76 But, the concept
of contradicting a treaty may not be of immediate concern in the present
case, as the court determined that the 1904 Peace Treaty did not establish
that unilateral actions could create separate obligations.77 This issue may
come into play once the Court hears the case on the merits, because forc-
ing Chile to negotiate access in "good faith" may inherently contradict
the treaty of 1904, which granted Chile the territory in perpetuity.7 8
The analysis in the 1974 Nuclear Tests case is more promising for Bo-
livia, however.79 The ICJ focuses on making its own determination of the
meaning and scope of unilateral acts, and holds that the declarations,
which are very similar to ones made by Chile, did, in fact, create a legal
obligation.8 0 A long history of treaties, wars, and distrust between the
two countries adds an extra layer that was not present in the previously
mentioned ICJ cases.81 Examining former holdings and analyses of the
ICJ shows that the Court is willing to hold officials accountable for their
71. Id.
72. Nuclear Tests, supra note 81.
73. Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), Summary of the Summary of the
Judgment (June 15, 1962), available at http://www.icjcij.org/docket/index.php?sum
=284&pl=3&p2=3&case=45&p3=5.
74. See id.; Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bol. v. Chile), Appli-
cation, ¶18 (April 24, 2013), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/153/
17338.pdf.
75. Temple of Preah Vihear, supra note 73.
76. See id.
77. Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bol. v. Chile), Judgment, ¶49
(September 24, 2015), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/153/18746.pdf.
78. Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bol. v. Chile), Preliminary
Objection, 147 (July 15, 2014), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/153/
18616.pdf.
79. See Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France), Summary of the Summary of the Judg-
ment (December 20, 1974), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/?sum=317&
code=nzf&pl=3&p2=3&case=59&k=6b&p3=5.
80. Id.; Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bol. v. Chile), Applica-
tion, $18 (April 24, 2013), available at, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/153/17338
.pdf.
81. See Bolivia/Chile Pacific Access, COUNCIL ON HEMISPH--RIc AIFAIRS, 14-17 (June
24, 2011), http://www.coha.org/boliviachile-pacific-access/#_ftnl.
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unilateral actions-but will distinctions in this case inhibit the ICJ from
doing the same?
III. LEGAL AND ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE CASE
A. IMPLICATIONS IF THE COURT RULES IN FAVOR OF BOLIVIA
1. Legal Implications
The legal implications could be far reaching if the ICJ rules that Chile's
actions have, in fact, created an obligation to negotiate access to the Pa-
cific. 8 2 A distinction must be made, however.8 3 There is a difference be-
tween the obligation to negotiate, and the obligation to grant sovereign
access. 84 An obligation to negotiate does not necessarily mean that Chile
must allocate its coastal land; it just suggests that the countries must par-
take in good faith negotiations, which may or may not lead to transfer in
land.8 5 The Court held that Bolivia's Application "does not ask the
Court to adjudge and declare that Bolivia has a right to sovereign ac-
cess." 86 Even so, a holding that would force these negotiations is precari-
ous because it risks setting a precedent that may deflate the power of all
international treaties.8 7 Countries may be less inclined to enter into in-
ternational treaties if they know that subsequent events may lead to obli-
gations that change the nature of the terms.88
Regardless of what the Court suggests, if Chile is forced to negotiate
sovereign, coastal access to Bolivia, it will directly contradict the 1904
Peace Treaty, which gave Chile ownership of the coastline in perpetuity.89
Treaties are incredibly powerful tools that promote peace and diplomacy
between countries around the world; diminishing this power could have a
detrimental effect on foreign relations.90 Countries could manipulate
their way into reneging parts of long-established treaties that may be un-
favorable to them.
Just as important, if the Court holds that Bolivia has the right to negoti-
ations for part of Chile's coastal territory established in a previous treaty,
countries would have a disincentive to participate in meaningful and pro-
82. Bolivia's Claim to the Sea: What's at Stake and Why it Matters, TELESURENGLISH,
(May 5, 2015), http://www.telesurtv.net/english/analysis/Bolivias-Claim-to-the-Sea-
Whats-at-Stake-and-Why-it-Matters-20150505-0010.html.
83. See Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bol. v. Chile), Judgment,





87. What is at Stake, MYTH1-- AND REALITY, http://www.mitoyrealidad.cl/what-is-at-
stake/mitoyrealidad/2014-12-19/143038.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2015).
88. See id.
89. Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bol. v. Chile), Preliminary
Objection, 147 (July 15, 2014), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/153/
18616.pdf.
90. See What is at Stake, supra note 87.
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ductive conversations?1 Bolivia's argument is that exchanges between
the two countries are the foundation of this obligation. 92 Thus, if coun-
tries may be penalized for engaging in diplomatic discussions about im-
proving the countries relations, why would they bother?93 Discouraging
constructive, international conversations is a dangerous precedent to set,
and the Court may be doing just that if it forces Chile to negotiate a
matter that is already established.
2. Economic Implications
The economic impact of a holding in favor of Bolivia could be signifi-
cant. But, if the court merely holds that an obligation to negotiate exists,
it doesn't guarantee sovereign access for Bolivia.94 Even this has power-
ful economic implications, as future litigation costs could run rampant, as
a court would likely supervise the process. The negotiation could poten-
tially be more complicated than the current litigation.
Furthermore, a forced negotiation between the two countries would
likely tarnish the already unhealthy relationship between the two, which
could lead to drastic, and even irrational behavior by either country. But,
if sovereignty were granted through negotiations, the effects would be
monumental.95 As previously discussed, the geographic constraints that
Bolivia is subject to is likely a reason for many of the trade issues Bolivia
is forced to endure. 96 With sovereign access to the coast, these concerns
would be diminished significantly, as it would allow Bolivia to decrease
its reliance on outdated and inefficient infrastructure and allow the coun-
try to develop new economic sectors like fishing to boost its economy.97 .
Additionally, Chile has become reliant on imported liquefied natural
gas (LNG) as a power source, and therefore, constructed various pipe-
lines and terminals throughout the country.9 8 Sovereign access to the sea
gained through negotiation would "necessarily include pipelines of LNG
ports."9 9 Even more dramatic, if the Court rules that the two must nego-
tiate to restore part of the Antofagasta territory that Bolivia once ob-
91. Id.
92. Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bol. v. Chile), Application,
¶31 (April 24, 2013), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/153/17338.pdf.
93. See What is at Stake, supra note 87.
94. See Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bol. v. Chile), Judgment,
¶32 (September 24, 2015), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/153/18746
.pdf.
95. Bolivia's Claim to the Sea: What's at Stake and Why it Matters, TELESURENGLISH,
(May 5, 2015), http://www.telesurtv.net/englishlanalysis/Bolivias-Claim-to-the-Sea-
Whats-at-Stake-and-Why-it-Matters-201.50505-0010.html.
96. See World Economic Forum, Global Enabling Trade Report 2014 77-79 (Mar-
gareta Drzeniek Hanouz et al. eds., 2014).
97. Bolivia's Claim to the Sea: What's at Stake and Why it Matters, supra note 95.
98. Martin De Angelis, Chile-Bolivia Land Dispute has long-term Implications for
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tained, it "would effective[ly] cut Chile in half."100 Also, because Bolivia
used to occupy the land that borders present-day Chile and Peru, "Chile
could lose its border with Peru and forever modify its foreign, military,
and commercial relations with one of its top trade partners."1 0
B. IMPLICATIONS IF THE COURT RULES IN FAVOR OF CHILE
1. Legal Implications
If the Court rules in favor of Chile, negotiations will not be entered
into and Bolivia will be denied the possibility of sovereign access to the
Pacific. One problem that could arise from this holding is that it could
devalue the words and actions of governmental authorities; they would
have hardly any meaning at all. 02 If statements and declarations hold no
weight when there is a treaty in place, countries would be inclined to say
and do anything that may benefit them, regardless if they intend to stand
true. 0 3 Declarations, like the one entered into between Bolivia and
Chile, would be meaningless.1 04 But, this is only the case if the end goal
of the conversations or actions is a matter that is already established and
governed by a previous treaty. 0 5 This ruling would not suggest that all
agreements and statements that countries have are inconsequential, just
ones about matters that are already cemented by a treaty. 106 In any legal
system, there must be hierarchy of law, and it makes sense that an inter-
national treaty would trump the actions of a country's officials.
2. Economic Implications
Status quo will be maintained if the ICJ rules in favor of Chile. This
would be a detrimental blow to Bolivia's hope of increasing trade effi-
ciency and catalyzing a struggling economy. 07 But, although Bolivia
would not have sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean, the Peace and
Friendship Treaty requires Chile to grant "the broadest freedom of com-
mercial transit through its territory and the ports of the Pacific."10 8 Thus,
Bolivia is privy to special treatment that most landlocked countries do
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See Roxana Forteza, International Law Back Return of Lost Territory,
PANAMPOST (May 27, 2015), https://panampost.comleditor/2015/05/27/should-
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.pdf.
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not enjoy. 109 For example, Bolivian goods can remain in the primary
zones of various Chilean ports for as much as nine months longer than
other countries, and enjoy free storage services for up to a year for im-
ports and sixty days for exports. 1 0 Furthermore, at the port of Arica,
Bolivia pays a tariff of $.85 per ton while other countries must pay $1.98
per ton for the same service.111 Chilean law also establishes a tax exemp-
tion from all taxes that may affect cargo in free transit from or towards
Bolivia through Chilean territory. 11 2 This special treatment may help re-
duce the detrimental effects of being landlocked, but it far from fixes it.
A holding in favor of Chile would inhibit hopes of economic growth and
prosperity for Bolivia.1 13
IV. CONCLUSION
The stakes are extraordinarily high, as this may be Bolivia's best
chance to gain sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean and revitalize its
struggling economy that is constricted by being landlocked. Bolivia faces
an uphill battle, however, due to the fact that it explicitly surrendered this
very land to Chile in the 1904 Peace Treaty. Bolivia's argument is that
various exchanges and declarations created an obligation to negotiate ac-
cess separate from the aforementioned Treaty. Unless Bolivia amends its
application, the Court will merely decide whether or not an obligation to
negotiate access exists. If the Court decides that the unilateral conduct
and declarations of various Chilean officials created a separate, legally
binding obligation, as it did in the Nuclear Test case, then Chile will only
be obligated to negotiate and not grant access, although this could create
enormous procedural complications itself. But, the Court will be faced
with the difficult conundrum of whether forcing Chile to simply negotiate
access inherently contradicts the Peace Treaty of 1904 by forcing Chile to
put forth a good faith effort to negotiate for land that it expressly owns.
The political, economic, and legal implications of the case are extreme. It
is obvious why both countries are so passionate about the issue; their
economy, their history, and their pride are on the line.
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